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Introduction 
In a striking passage at the end of his classic paper “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Frank 
Jackson observed that “it is not sufficiently appreciated that physicalism is an 
extremely optimistic view of our epistemic powers.  If it is true, we have, in very 
broad outline admittedly, a grasp our place in the scheme of things.  Certain matters 
of shear complexity defeat us…but in principle we have it all” (1982, 135).  Jackson 
went on to suggest that, from a perspective that emphasizes that we are organic beings 
with an evolutionary history and limited psychological capacities this fact about 
physicalism renders it quite implausible.  
It seems to me that Jackson’s instincts on target here, at least as regards the 
sort of materialism1 he mostly had in mind, that is, the sort promoted by such 
philosophers as J.J.C.Smart (1959) and David Lewis (1983, 1994).  However, what 
Jackson does not say is that the same thing is true of dualism.  For dualism (at least in 
the form opposed by such philosophers as Smart and Lewis) agrees with materialism 
about all aspects of reality with one exception, viz., the particular states of mind 
having to do with consciousness.   Moreover, while these states are an exception to 
materialism, they are not an exception to an extremely optimistic view of our powers, 
since the dualist typically supposes that the subjects who are in these states know 
what they are in what Lewis later called an "uncommonly demanding sense" (see 
Lewis 1995).   Hence, just as it is not sufficiently appreciated that materialism is an 
extremely optimistic view, it is likewise not sufficiently appreciated that dualism is 
too.  Indeed both of the traditional positions in philosophy of mind—materialism and 
dualism—presuppose that “in principle we have it all”. If, following Jackson, we 
regard that presupposition as false (or is at least as incredibly unlikely) both positions 
should be rejected.   
What happens to the philosophy of mind if we reject both of these standard 
positions?  I think that doing so puts us in a position to formulate new solutions to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Thanks to the editors of this volume, Barry Dainton and Howard Robinson, for comments on a 
previous draft. 
 
1 I will use the phrase ‘materialism’ in this paper rather than ‘physicalism,’ which is used here by 
Jackson.  Nothing turns on this, though the history of these words is of some interest. For discussion 
see ch.1 of Stoljar 2010. 
For Dainton and Robinson (eds) Continuum Companion to Analytic Philosophy 
	   2	  
some of the central question of philosophy of mind, including the problem of 
consciousness and the problem of intentionality. The solutions do not involve what 
some philosophers say they want, a theory or account of consciousness or 
intentionality.  But I think it is on reflection a mistake to expect solutions of this sort 
in any case, at least at the present stage of knowledge; the precise account of what 
consciousness or intentionality is and how they fit into the world are problems that 
will be solved if at all, by total science, by the science whatever it is that will be 
reached in the (perhaps hypothetical) end of inquiry. In the meantime, however, what 
philosophers certainly can do is assess whether certain lines of reasoning concerning 
consciousness or intentionality that lead to philosophically objectionable (or at any 
rate striking) conclusions are persuasive or not.  When I say that rejecting the standard 
positions provides us with a solution to these problems it is solutions of this latter sort 
I have in mind. 
This paper traces out how rejecting the standard positions leads to solutions of 
this kind. After providing some context for the issues, I start with the problem of 
consciousness, and briefly review my own favored epistemic solution to that 
problem—a solution hinted at but not developed in the passage from Jackson, and 
which I have set out elsewhere (see Stoljar 2006, 2006a).  Then, in the bulk of the 
paper, I will consider how to extend this epistemic solution to the problem of 
intentionality.  As I will explain, this is a non-trivial matter because the problem of 
intentionality is distinct from the problem of consciousness in not involving 
counterparts of the arguments distinctive of consciousness, such as the knowledge 
argument and the conceivability argument, and it is most obviously arguments of this 
style are subject to an epistemic response.  So to see how to connect issues of 
ignorance to intentionality we will need to formulate the problem of intentionality in a 
more explicit way than it is usually done. In the brief concluding section of the paper, 
I will make a remark about a third issue, the problem of self-knowledge, which is a 
problem that is different from the problem of consciousness and intentionality in, but 
which has emerged as a key problem, perhaps the key problem, in philosophy of mind 
in recent years.  I will suggest that while rejecting the standard positions does not 
solve this problem, the materials we assemble when thinking through the perspective 
suggested by Jackson are nevertheless important when we turn to this problem. 
 
Responding to Our Inner Cartesian 
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One of the key events in philosophy of mind in the last hundred years—arguably, the 
key event—was the appearance in 1949 of Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle’s book 
The Concept of Mind.  Ryle defined himself—and many philosophers of mind 
following him have likewise defined themselves—in opposition to someone called the 
‘Cartesian’.  The connection between Ryle’s Descartes and the real Descartes is 
tenuous, and in any case isn’t really to the point.  Rather Ryle’s Descartes acts as a 
foil in philosophy of mind rather as the sceptic about the external world acts as a foil 
in epistemology.  The point is not to refute a real person, i.e. someone who may or 
may not be the famous figure of 17th century philosophy and science.  The point is 
rather to critically engage with an intellectual tendency which according to Ryle 
greatly influences our own contemporary philosophical interpretations of ordinary and 
scientific psychology, and which stands in the way of the attempt to provide a 
plausible general picture of human cognitive capacities in their relation to the rest of 
the world.   
 What exactly is this tendency?  Ryle’s Descartes holds two key theses.  First, 
he holds the metaphysical thesis that mental phenomena and physical phenomena are 
wholly distinct; that is, he is a traditional dualist.  Second, he holds the 
epistemological thesis that mental phenomena are wholly transparent to themselves; 
that is, each of us is equipped with a faculty of introspection that, if used properly, 
will provide us in principle with complete and infallible knowledge of the contents of 
our minds.  Throughout Concept, Ryle develops a barrage of techniques and 
suggestions designed to undercut both theses.  Nowadays many of these techniques 
and suggestions are unpopular, but the project he initiated—the project of 
accommodating our inner Cartesian, as we might put it—is still with us.  Indeed, it is 
no exaggeration to say that the dominant focus of philosophy of mind since Ryle has 
been on the first of the two theses just distinguished.   
 The obvious way to resist being a traditional dualist is to become a traditional 
materialist, and indeed, this is the lesson that many philosophers took from Ryle.  But 
Ryle himself thought that the traditional materialist holds a position that is almost as 
bad as the traditional dualist, since both hold a presupposition that is false.  According 
to Ryle (at least as I read him2) the false presupposition at issue is that ordinary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In Concept, Ryle says that sentences such as 'John Doe knows French' are "neither reports of 
observed or observable states of affairs, nor yet reports of unob- served or unobservable states of 
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psychological declarative sentences are fact-stating just as ordinary physical 
declarative sentences are; that is, the sentence ‘Otto is anxious’ states a fact just as 
‘Otto is 6 foot 2 in his stockinged feet’ states a fact.  The dualist thinks that ‘Otto is 
anxious’ states a fact, namely one about a realm only contingently connected to the 
physical.  The materialist thinks it states a fact about ordinary bodies.  Ryle suggests 
that both sides are mistaken because ‘Otto is anxious’—and psychological 
declaratives generally— states no fact at all.  In that sense both standard materialism 
and standard dualism are to be rejected. 
However, it is difficult to make sense of the idea that ‘Otto is anxious’ states 
no fact.  For what does ‘state no fact’ mean? A very common suggestion is that a 
declarative sentence states no fact just in case an assertion of that sentence does not 
conventionally express a belief, and instead expresses a non-belief, say a desire or 
intention or command.  So for example the sentence ‘You will do your violin 
practice’ might conventionally express a command, rather than a belief about the 
future. However, if this is what it is to be fact-stating, it is hard to believe that 
ordinary psychological sentences are not fact-stating; after all, does ‘Otto is anxious’ 
not conventionally express the belief that Otto is anxious? What would constitute 
evidence that it does not?  And anyway, to say that a sentence is conventionally used 
to express beliefs (or is not conventionally used to express beliefs) is itself a statement 
of fact about psychology, so, if it is true, Ryle’s position threatens to be self-
undermining. 
 So in my view Ryle’s suggestion about things not being fact-stating does not 
represent a productive way to think about these issues. On the other hand, I do think 
he is right that both standard materialism and standard dualism presuppose something 
false.  For they both presuppose an overly optimistic view of our powers.  They both 
presuppose as Jackson says that ‘in principle we have it all’. But how does rejecting 
this presupposition allow us to respond to Ryle’s Cartesian? In the next section I will 
consider how to respond to the part of the Cartesian picture that most people think is 
the hardest to deal with:  the problem of consciousness.  
 
The Problem of Consciousness  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
affairs."' (1949, p. 120). I take it that what Ryle meant by this is that expressions such as 'John Doe 
knows French', and presumably other psychological reports, are not in the fact stating business. 
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One might have thought that it would be an easy matter to reject the first thesis held 
by Ryle’s Descartes, i.e. metaphysical dualism.  Surely a small dose of scientifically 
informed common sense—according to which humans are evolved creatures as much 
a part of the natural order as zebra fish or xenopus toads—is sufficient to dispel the 
idea that each of us is a complex of a body and soul, a picture apparently belonging 
more the history of religion than to contemporary philosophical thought.  As it turns 
out, however, things are not so simple. For as a number of philosophers of mind from 
the 1970s on argued (Kripke 1980, Nagel 1974, Jackson 1982, Robinson 1982 and 
Chalmers 1996) dualist modes of thought not only can be divorced from any religious 
element, but can be founded on extremely compelling and simple intuitions about 
consciousness and then developed with considerable clarity using machinery 
borrowed from modern modal logic, semantics and epistemology.  To accommodate 
Cartesianism in this sophisticated modernized form requires us to ask some searching 
questions not only about our conceptions of nature and the mind but also about our 
conception of philosophical method.   
 One very plausible form of reasoning here has come to be called ‘the 
knowledge argument’. This argument may be set out in various ways, but a simple 
version has it as proceeding from two main premises.  The first premise concerns 
what it is possible for a person to know; in particular, it is possible for a person to 
know all the physical facts as well as every fact that follows a priori from the physical 
facts, and yet not know what it is like to have an experience of certain type. Jackson’s 
(1982) Mary is the best known, but not the only, illustration of this possibility.3 The 
second premise of the knowledge argument is that if this is possible then materialism 
is false.  The conclusion is that materialism is false, or anyway it is false if there are 
facts about what it is like to have certain experiences and if people know these facts. 
 How to respond to this argument?  There are a number of existing proposals in 
the literature.  One response, the ability response, is based on a distinction that Ryle 
himself developed and defended in Concept, namely the distinction propositional 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge attributed by sentences of the form ‘S knows that such and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Here is Lewis’s very vivid description of the case:  “Mary, a brilliant scientist, has lived from birth in 
a cell where everything is black and white. (Even she herself is painted all over.) She views the world 
on black-and-white television. By television she reads books, she joins in discussion, she watches the 
results of experiments done under her direction. In this way she becomes the worlds leading expert on 
color and color vision and the brain states produced by exposure to colors.  But she doesn’t know what 
it is like to see color.  And she never will, unless she escapes from her cell” (1988, 263).  
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such’, and know how, i.e. knowledge attributed by sentences of the form ‘S knows 
how to such and such’. Armed with this distinction proponents of the ability response 
say that while Mary learns something when she comes out of her room, she does not 
learn any propositional knowledge but rather gains a sort of know-how.4  
But this proposal is problematic in two ways.  First, it is not clear that there is 
any distinction here of the kind the ability response requires (see Stanley and 
Williamson 2001, Stanley 2011). Sentences of the form ‘S knows how to such and 
such’ seem to be semantically similar to sentences such as ‘S knows where such and 
such is’ or ‘S know who such and such is’.  But these sentences are usually thought of 
as attributing a sort of propositional knowledge; for example, when you know where 
something is, you know, for some suitably described place t, that the thing in question 
is at t.  Likewise, if you know how to do something, it seems natural to say that you 
know, for some suitably described way of doing something w, that the thing in 
question is done in way w.  If any analysis along these lines is correct, the ability 
hypothesis looks to be in serious trouble.5  
The second problem is that, even if the know how/know that distinction is 
granted, the ability response relies on the idea that the experience Mary has when she 
comes out of her room and sees color for the first time is a novel experience.  The 
general idea is that since she has not had the experience she does not have the relevant 
abilities or know-how; similarly, when she does have the experience she will gain the 
abilities or know-how.  However, it is possible to develop the knowledge argument on 
the basis of examples that do not involve novel experiences (see Stoljar 2005, 2006).  
For such examples it is implausible that Mary gains a new ability—for she already has 
the ability in question (having already had the experience).  If so, the ability 
hypothesis is not a good reply to the knowledge argument.  
 A different sort of response appeals to a distinction between two kinds of 
materialism—a priori and a posteriori materialism, as I will call them here.6  Suppose 
that we have a sentence ‘S’ which somehow or other captures every physical fact of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For the classic defence of the ability hypothesis see Lewis 1988, and the references therein.  
 
5 I do not say that this objection is conclusive; it depends if there is a fallback position for the ability 
response.  For some discussion of this see Stoljar forthcoming 
 
6 In Chalmers 1996, these positions are referred to as ‘Type-A materialism’ (= a priori materialism) and 
‘Type-B materialism’ (= a posteriori materialism). 
 
For Dainton and Robinson (eds) Continuum Companion to Analytic Philosophy 
	   7	  
the world; and suppose we have a second sentence ‘S*’ which somehow or other 
captured every psychological fact.  Materialism of any sort is committed to the view 
that the material conditional formed from these sentences—that is, ‘If S then S*’— is 
necessary. The a priori materialist says that the conditional is necessary and a priori; 
the a posteriori materialist says that the conditional is necessary and a posteriori.  
Armed with this distinction, the a posteriori materialist response says that the 
knowledge argument shows at most that a priori materialism is false. But this leaves it 
open that a posteriori materialism is true.   
But this response faces problems too. First, a number of philosophers insist 
that a posteriori materialism is not a possible position, however attractive it looks in 
the abstract.  For these philosophers, there are theses in philosophy of language and 
epistemology that entail if materialism is true then a priori materialism is true (see, 
e.g., Lewis 1994, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996).  These theses are contested of 
course, and we will not go in to them here (see, e.g, Stalnaker 2003).  But the fact that 
many philosophers think that posteriori materialism is not simply false but impossible 
at least shows that appealing to the necessary a posteriori is no easy response to the 
knowledge argument.   
The second problem is that the a posteriori materialism response to the 
knowledge argument even if correct is likely to win the battle but not the war.  For the 
knowledge argument is just one argument against materialism about consciousness.  
Other arguments, such as the conceivability argument, are not going to be defeated by 
drawing a distinction between necessary a posteriori, since those arguments focus 
directly on the question of whether the connection between the mental and the 
physical is necessary—the question of whether the connection is in addition a 
posteriori or not is from this point a view a sideshow.  (A quick argument for this 
conclusion is that Kripke himself advanced something very much like the 
conceivability argument in Naming and Necessity, but also provided (in the same 
work) the materials for formulating a posteriori materialism.  Kripke himself 
evidently did not think that a posteriori materialism would be able to answer the 
conceivability argument, which is good evidence, but of course not conclusive 
evidence, that a posteriori materialism will not answer the conceivability argument.)7 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For my own development of the issues raised in this paragraph, see Stoljar 2006, 2006a. 
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The Epistemic Response to the Consciousness Problem 
If these common responses to the knowledge argument fail, how should one respond? 
In my view, the best response draws on the idea suggested in the passage from 
Jackson above.   
Suppose that there is a type of non-experiential or physical fact of which we 
are ignorant but that is relevant to the nature of experience.  (In other work, I have 
called this supposition ‘the ignorance hypothesis’.)  Now take the claim that it is 
possible that someone knows all the physical facts and not all the facts.  Such a claim 
involves the phrase ‘all the physical facts,’ which is what philosophers of language 
call ‘a quantifier phrase’.  How should we interpret this phrase?  Well if we suppose 
that the ignorance hypothesis is true, and there are physical facts of which we are 
ignorant but which are relevant, then we have two choices:  to include them in the 
scope of the quantifier or not.  Suppose first that they are included.  Then it is not 
clear that we are entitled to assert the possibility claim.  Is plausible to say that 
someone can know all the facts (including one’s of which we are ignorant) and yet not 
know all the facts?  How can we assert that if we are ignorant of some of the relevant 
facts?  Suppose now that they are not included.  Now the possibility claim looks 
plausible; the physical facts that we currently know do indeed seem to be such that 
someone could know all of them and not know some phenomenal facts.  But this 
possibility claim does not threaten materialism because at most it shows that facts 
about experience come apart from some physical facts not from them all.  Putting this 
together, if the ignorance hypothesis is true, the knowledge argument is unpersuasive. 
  This response, if correct, will tell us that the knowledge argument is 
unpersuasive; to that extent the response is not committed to dualism.  But one might 
reasonably ask why the position does not commit us to materialism, and if so, what 
happened to the point I mentioned before, that both standard materialism and standard 
dualism are to be rejected, just as Ryle thought (though not for Ryle’s reasons). Isn’t 
the epistemic response to the argument a straightforward response on behalf of the 
materialism?  
The answer to this question is ‘no’, or better, ‘it depends on what you mean by 
materialism’. One way of spelling out materialism is to construe it as advancing a 
particular positive view about the physical world—e.g. that contemporary physics (or 
something very like it) gives a complete statement of the world and what it is like.  
That is the sort of materialism which Lewis, for example defends, the sort I have so 
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far called ‘standard materialism’.  The epistemic response I have suggested is not 
available to a materialist of that sort, precisely because a materialist of that sort 
supposes that in principle we have it all.  But one might use the term ‘materialism’ in 
a non-standard way, i.e. to mean any position that supposes that the knowledge 
argument (and similar arguments) are unsound and that in consequence they provide 
us with no reason to suppose that facts about consciousness are fundamental. Using 
the label in that way, it is possible to say that materialism and the epistemic view are 
compatible.  But that does not mean the epistemic view does not involve a rejection of 
standard materialism. 
 Of course the epistemic approach to the knowledge argument faces a number 
of challenges. Some argue that we are not ignorant in the way that the response 
requires; others argue that even if we are, then this will not have the effect on the 
arguments that the approach assumes it will.  I have responded to these problems in 
detail elsewhere, and will not go over them here (see Stoljar 2006).  Instead, my aim 
in what follows is to consider whether the sort of response just sketched to the 
problem of consciousness may be applied to other problems in philosophy of mind.8  
 
The Problem of the Problem of Intentionality 
Traditionally, philosophers have distinguished the problems presented for materialism 
by phenomenal consciousness from those presented by another aspect of mental 
states, what contemporary philosophers—roughly following the 19th century 
philosopher, Brentano—called their intentionality.  The intentionality of a mental 
state is its aboutness. When I think of Vienna or I believe that the computer is on the 
desk or I fear that the planet will get hotter, and so on, I instantiate mental states 
which are in a hard to define sense about Vienna, or the computer on the desk or 
planet Earth.  The idea is that mental states and events have a property rather like 
signs, sentences, and gestures; that is, they are about or represent things other than 
themselves. 
 Can we extend the epistemic response just suggested from the problem of 
consciousness to the problem of intentionality?  Before we answer this question we 
need to be clear about what the problem of intentionality is.  For, while it is certainly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In Stoljar 2006 I was very wary of extending the epistemic response to consciousness to other 
problems.  The present paper represents a slight (but only slight) softening of that position. 
For Dainton and Robinson (eds) Continuum Companion to Analytic Philosophy 
	   10	  
traditional to talk about the problem of intentionality, it is harder than you might think 
to formulate the problem in any precise way.   
In the light of our discussion of the problem of consciousness, a natural first 
thought is that there is a problem of intentionality in just the same way as there is a 
problem of consciousness. So for example, just as we formulated a knowledge 
argument for consciousness, we might formulate a counterpart ‘knowledge argument’ 
for intentionality. The first premise of this argument would say that it is possible for a 
person to know all the physical facts as well as every fact that follows a priori from 
the physical facts, and yet not know what people believe, (e.g.) does not know that 
Hillary believes that Obama is president (assuming that Hillary does believe this).  
The second premise is that if this is possible then materialism is false.  The conclusion 
is that materialism is false.  If there were such a persuasive argument, we could 
formulate the problem of intentionality, on analogy with the problem of 
consciousness, as the problem of saying what if anything is wrong with this argument. 
 But the problem is that there is no intuitive foundation to this counterpart 
knowledge argument.  The Mary case provides us with an initially plausible case of 
someone who knows all the physical facts and yet does not know what it is like to see 
colour.  (That the case is not plausible on reflection does not mean it is not initially 
plausible.) But there seems to be no similarly plausible case of someone who knows 
all the physical facts and yet does not know that Hillary believes that Obama is 
president.  Mary herself, for example, seems perfectly capable of knowing facts of 
this sort. If someone told her while in the room what Hillary believes, she might well 
come to know that she believes that Obama is president, and there seems no aspect of 
Hillary’s belief of which she is ignorant. 
 It might be thought that while Mary may be able to come to know what 
Hillary believes in this way, there still seems to be gap between a complete 
description of the world in basic physical terms, and the existence of Hillary’s belief.  
For example, if Mary were to read a description of Hillary’s brain in basic physical 
terms, would she then be able to work out – from this description alone – what Hillary 
believes? If the answer to this is ‘no’—as it seems to be—then why is there not a 
knowledge argument for intentionality after all?9    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Thanks to Barry Dainton for this objection. 
For Dainton and Robinson (eds) Continuum Companion to Analytic Philosophy 
	   11	  
However, this line of thought assumes that Mary’s knowledge is limited to a 
certain sort of physical information about Hillary’s brain, for example to cellular 
information.  It is true that from this alone one cannot work out what Hillary believes.  
But Mary’s knowledge is not limited in this way; indeed it is an important strength of 
the knowledge argument in its original form that Mary is permitted to know anything 
that she could come to know while in the room.   So for example, suppose Mary has 
access not just to cellular information about Hillary but also to computational, 
functional, behavioural and environmental information.  If so, it is hard to believe that 
she could not come to know that Hillary believes that Obama is president, even if, as 
the original argument alleges, she could not come to know what it’s like to see color. 
 Alternatively, it might be thought that there is an important class of intentional 
states which Mary could not come to know, viz., those that are also states of 
consciousness associated with experiencing colour.  On many views, after all, such 
states are themselves intentional states and so (one might think) it is quite an easy 
matter to produce a plausible case in which someone knows all the physical facts and 
yet does not know an intentional fact—perhaps the Mary case is precisely such a case.  
However, while this might be true, it does not affect the basic issue.  The 
problem of intentionality is supposed to concern intentional states as such, not merely 
intentional states which are also conscious states.  Indeed, it is for this reason that it is 
natural to attempt to formulate the problem in terms of a standing belief such as the 
example of Hillary’s belief. And if we focus on intentional states as such (i.e., those 
that are not also conscious states) then it seems there is no knowledge argument about 
intentionality. 
 If the problem of intentionality is not to be explained on a direct analogy with 
the problem of consciousness, perhaps it comes about from the idea that intentional 
properties are not fundamental?  Here is Jerry Fodor forcefully giving voice to this 
idea: 
 
I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue 
they’ve been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of 
things.  When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps 
appear upon their list.  But aboutness surely won’t; intentionality simply 
doesn’t go that deep. It’s hard to see, in face of this consideration, how 
one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some 
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extent or other, a Reductionist.  If the semantic and the intentional are real 
properties, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe of their 
supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor 
semantic.  If aboutness is real, it must be really something else. (1987, p. 
97) 
 
The most obvious thing Fodor is saying in this passage is that intentionality is not a 
fundamental feature of the world.  However, while this is plausible, it is again not 
sufficient to generate a problem about intentionality.  For the same thing can be said 
about almost everything.  For example, take the Mariana Trench.  When the physicists 
complete the catalogue they’ve been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible 
properties of things, being the Mariana Trench surely won’t be on that list either. The 
Mariana Trench goes deep but not that deep. But nobody thinks that there is a 
philosophical problem about the Mariana Trench.  Put differently:  if there is a 
problem of intentionality at all, it had presumably have something to do with 
intentionality, but the fact that intentional properties are not fundamental is a fact 
shared by many things.10 
 At this point a third suggestion about what the problem of intentionality is 
naturally suggests itself. Intentionality is usually associated with a number of 
interesting logical features, and the problem of intentionality might be thought of as 
the problem of coming to grips with these features. Suppose for example, that Hilary 
believed, not that Obama is president, but that Odin is.  In that case she would have a 
belief about Odin rather than a belief about Obama.  But off-hand this is puzzling.  To 
have a belief about Obama might be thought of involving a relation between Obama 
and the person who has the belief—Hillary in this case. But the example of Odin 
shows that this cannot be so, or at least cannot be so in general.  Hillary cannot stand 
in any relation to Odin for the simple reason that Odin does not exist.  How then can 
she believe that Odin is president? 
 However while it is certainly challenging to explain the sense in which Hillary 
can have a thought about Odin, it is doubtful that we can straightforwardly appeal to 
this to raise the problem of intentionality, at any rate not if we are out to formulate a 
problem that has something to do with the contrast between materialism and dualism.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For some literature in which points like this are emphasized, see Stich 1992, and Tye 1992.  
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For the Odin problem has nothing to do with the truth or not of materialism! Suppose 
for example that dualism of some very straightforward kind is true, and that Hillary 
was a complex of a soul and a body—it would still be puzzling how something that 
exists can apparently stand in a relation to something that does not.  Similarly, 
suppose that it were a fundamental fact of nature that Hillary believes that Odin is 
president—even so, it would remain the case that the fact in question cannot be 
analysed as relation between Hillary and Odin, for there is no such relation.  
In summary, before we confront the problem of intentionality, we had better 
confront the problem of the problem of intentionality, i.e. the problem of saying what 
the problem of intentionality is.  As we have seen, is not generated by a counterpart 
for intentionality of arguments like the knowledge argument—for there is no such 
argument.  It is not generated by the fact that intentionality is not a fundamental 
feature of reality—for while it plausibly is not fundamental, this is not a feature of 
intentionality in particular. And it is not generated by the fact that intentionality 
exhibits interesting logical features—for while these features need explanation, doing 
so seems to have nothing to do with the distinction between dualism and materialism. 
What then is the problem? 
 
The Descriptive/Foundational Distinction 
In my view, a good way to proceed here11 is to start with a distinction that is well 
known in the philosophy of language but is often less explicitly drawn in the 
philosophy of mind. This is a distinction, in Robert Stalnaker’s (1997) terms, between 
questions of descriptive, and questions of foundational, semantics.  The descriptive 
semantic project, as Stalnaker describes it, concerns what language we as a 
community speak, or if we confront the issue in an individualist framework, what 
language a particular individual speaks. Suppose, to fix ideas, we focus on a particular 
person—Karl, for example, the hero of David Lewis’s (1974) paper ‘Radical 
Interpretation’. The descriptive semantic project with respect to Karl is then the 
project of saying what language it is that he speaks.  
 This question about Karl is an empirical question.   It might be that he speaks 
some particular dialect or idiolect of English, or it might be that he speaks some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 A rather different way to proceed is to connect the intentionality issue more directly with 
consciousness, as suggested for example in Johnston 2007 and Pautz 2010.  I will not try to engage 
directly with these interesting ideas in what follows. 
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particular dialect or idiolect of Urdu.  (That the answer to this descriptive semantic 
question may seem obvious does not mean it is not empirical.) Likewise, it might be 
that he speaks a language in which names are semantically equivalent to definite 
descriptions or that he speaks a language in which names are not semantically 
equivalent to definite descriptions.  (That the answer to this descriptive semantic 
question may seem unobvious does not mean it is not empirical.) 
Now if the descriptive semantic project is empirical, to solve it we need to 
attend to various sources of evidence that we have about Karl.  How he acts in 
particular circumstances is surely one good source of evidence, and as are the 
judgments he (and we) would make about when certain sentences are true and under 
what conditions. It might also be that other sorts of evidence—say about what sort of 
creature Karl is—are also relevant. Indeed, in principle anything at all can be 
evidence for the hypothesis that Karl speaks a particular language; all that is required 
is that the evidence, together with background assumptions, makes the hypothesis 
more probable than it would otherwise be. 
 In saying that the question of what language Karl speaks is an empirical 
question, I am not denying that there are a priori, or at least very general, constraints 
on what it is for Karl or anybody to speak a language, and that these general 
constraints will also factor into descriptive semantics.  For example, one condition 
mentioned by Stalnaker is this:  “if the semantics is correct, then speakers must know, 
at least for the most part, what according to the semantics they are saying” 
(1997,176).  As I understand it a condition like this functions to narrow down the 
possibilities of what language it is that Karl is speaking.  A priori, after all, the 
possibilities are endless and the evidence that we have about Karl will surely 
underdetermine which language he speaks.   But the assumption that Karl must be 
assumed to know what he is saying, at least for the most part, serves to narrow down 
the possible languages which—we can reasonably suppose—Karl speaks. 
 Suppose now that after reviewing the evidence and the relevant general 
constraints we agree that Karl speaks a particular language—L17 as it might be.  Then 
we face what Stalnaker calls foundational semantic questions; these are questions 
about “what the facts are that give expression their semantic values, and more 
generally, about what makes it the case that the language spoken by a particular 
individual or community is a language with a particular descriptive semantics” 
(1997,167).  Concerning Karl, then, questions at the foundational level concern what 
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facts about him—e.g. what psychological, physical, or behavioural facts—explain that 
he speaks L17 rather than something else or nothing at all.  Presumably for example 
there are facts about Karl that make it the case that L17 is a version of English rather 
than what we call Urdu (if it is). And presumably too there are facts about Karl that 
make it the case that L17 is a language that contains names not equivalent to any 
definite description (again: if it is).  Questions at the foundational level ask what 
exactly these facts are. 
 
From Language to Mind 
Now, as the reference to semantics makes clear, the descriptive/foundational 
distinction is in the first instance a distinction in the philosophy of language.  But the 
problem of intentionality if it is anything is a problem in the philosophy of mind. So, 
to connect this distinction to the problem of the problem of intentionality we would 
need to transpose it from the key of language to the key of mind.  How is this 
transposition to be achieved? 
One proposal might be to suggest that Karl has a language of thought, and 
then to apply the distinction directly to Karl’s language of thought.  Descriptive 
semantics for the language of thought from this point of view proceeds just like 
descriptive semantics for English or Urdu.  However, formulating the problem of 
intentionality this way seems to me a mistake.  The problem is not that Karl does not 
have a language of thought.  Arguments such as those given by Fodor (e.g. Fodor 
1987) seem to me quite compelling; they provide good empirical evidence (though of 
course not conclusive evidence) that Karl has a language of thought, or at any rate 
would if (as we are assuming) he is a human being like the rest of us.  The problem is 
rather that the hypothesis that Karl has the language of thought is a quite specific 
psychological hypothesis about him; much more specific, for example, than the 
hypothesis that he has a mind or is the subject of intentional states at all. On the face 
of it, it is possible (even if not actual) that Karl could have intentional states without 
having a language of thought. But if that is so, we do not want to explain what the 
problem of intentionality is in terms of the language of thought.  
 A better proposal is to draw a distinction between (as I will say) descriptive 
psychology and foundational psychology (i.e. on direct analogy with descriptive and 
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foundational semantics).12  Descriptive psychology is the project of saying what 
mental states Karl has; for example, what states or systems of states of knowledge, 
belief, desire, feeling, perception, imagination, memory he has. As in the case of 
descriptive semantics, the questions one raises concerning descriptive psychology are 
empirical questions, and so will need to be responsive to some sort of evidence.  Once 
again, our evidence here will surely include how Karl acts in particular circumstances.  
But we also might include evidence about how similar Karl is to us, about what sort 
of creature he is and so on. For example, if Karl stubs is toe, and jumps around, it 
would be natural for us to attribute to Karl pain of the sort that we would feel if we 
were in the same sort of situation.  
In saying that the question of what mind Karl has is an empirical question, I 
am as before not denying that there are a priori, or at least very general, constraints 
on, or theses about, what it is for Karl to have a mind, and that these general 
constraints will also factor into descriptive psychology. For example, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that if Karl has some belief states, then together with other 
states that will cause him to act in certain ways.  But the suggestion that belief states 
have causal powers seems to be a claim about what beliefs are in general, rather than 
a specific claim about what beliefs Karl has.  
Suppose now that after reviewing the evidence and the relevant general 
constraints we agree that Karl has a particular mind—M17 as it might be.  Then, in 
parallel with the language case, we face foundational psychological questions; these 
are questions about what facts about Karl make it true that he has M17 as opposed to 
some other mind, or opposed to no mind at all.  If one is a dualist one might well say 
that Karl’s having M17 is a fundamental fact, whereas if one is not a dualist one will 
say that there are other facts about him in virtue of which he has M17. The 
foundational project is to say what those facts are. 
 
The Intentionality Problem and Descriptive Psychology 
We have reviewed the descriptive/foundational distinction, and proposed a way to 
extend that distinction to the philosophy of mind. But how does this help with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
12 In his 1997, Stalnaker agrees (as I read him) that the descriptive/foundational distinction has a 
counterpart in the philosophy of mind, but does not go into detail about what that counterpart is, 
beyond noting (as I have done) that appealing directly to the language of thought is a mistake.  See also 
Stalnaker 2004.  
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formulating the problem of intentionality, with ‘the problem of the problem of 
intentionality’ as I called it earlier?  
Well, it is very common, in the light of this distinction, to say that the problem 
of intentionality is a problem about foundational rather than descriptive semantics.  
Transposing this to the key of mind, the suggestion is that the problem of 
intentionality is a problem about foundational rather than descriptive psychology.  I 
think there is something right about this suggestion, but it is also misleading.  The 
reason it is misleading is that a lot of the issues that philosophers of mind discuss 
when they discuss the problem of intentionality turn out to be on the descriptive side 
of the divide. I will give four examples.  
First, take the problem of thinking about non-existent things, such as Odin, 
that we considered a moment ago.  Suppose that the mind that we attribute to Karl—
M17—includes the belief that Odin likes ravens.  If so, we cannot construe this belief 
as involving a relation between Karl and the subject of his beliefs, i.e. Odin.  For Odin 
does not exist; hence it is impossible for Karl to stand in a relation to him. This is 
certainly an aspect of the problem of intentionality, but as we noted before it has very 
little to do with the contrast between dualism and materialism.  In the light of the 
descriptive/foundational distinction it seems fairly clear why:  the problem is one of 
descriptive psychology.   To see this, notice that a common way to solve this problem 
is to say that the mind that Karl has (i.e. M17) must somehow involve a relation 
between Karl and an abstract object, for example the property of being the king of the 
Gods, who plucked out one eye to gain infinite wisdom, who has an eight-legged 
horse etc.  This abstract object exists but is not instantiated, i.e. because Odin does not 
exist.  We might also want to say that if Karl has beliefs about Obama this too 
involves a relation to an abstract object, it is just that in this case the abstract object is 
instantiated, i.e. in Obama.  Making these assumptions about the mind that Karl has 
raises further issues—how a concrete object can stand in relation to an abstract object, 
for example.  I will not go into that here.  The point is that the hypothesis that Karl 
stands in a relation to various abstract objects seems to be something we arrive at 
through theorizing about what sort of mind he has, and so through descriptive 
psychology.  
Second, take the dispute in the philosophy of perception over whether 
perceptual states are relations to concrete objects, as emphasized by disjunctivists, or 
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whether they are involve representational states of some sort.13  This is an aspect of a 
question about intentionality too, but it again it is a question in descriptive 
psychology. For example, if we attribute M17 to Karl, this will certainly involve some 
facts about perception, and about how perception relates to belief and so forth.  What 
is the nature of perception?  The representationalist says that perceptual states are in 
some ways akin to belief states in that they involve a certain kind of representational 
state.  Suppose for example that M17 is a mind that involves a certain kind of 
representational state of the sort mentioned by representationalists, while M92 
involves no such state, and simply says that Karl bears a phenomenological relation to 
his surroundings.  Both hypotheses are plausibly compatible with various sorts of 
data, e.g. behavioural data and introspective data, but they are different from each 
other.  The disjunctivist thinks that the problem with saying that Karl has M17 is that 
there is no M17 to have, i.e. for there are no perceptual representational states at all.  
The representationalist, by contrast, thinks that is not so, and that M17 is a possible 
mind.  If so, there is no problem with saying that Karl has M17. 
A third example concerns principles of charity, as discussed famously, for 
example, by Donald Davidson (see Davidson 1974).  According to him, when we 
attribute M17 to Karl, we should be driven by the a priori principle that most of Karl’s 
beliefs are true, and presumably that most of Karl’s perceptual states are veridical.  
Suppose the hypothesis that Karl has M17 entails that most of his beliefs are true, 
while the hypothesis that Karl has M45 entails that most of his beliefs are false.  
Davidson’s principle of charity is that it is constitutive of the nature of belief that 
most of a person’s beliefs are true.  So while M17 might be equivalent to M45 in 
respect of behavioural evidence, it is rational for us to adopt the hypothesis that M17 
is Karl’s.  Other philosophers disagree with Davidson here, arguing that we have no a 
priori reason to favor M17 over M45.  I don’t want to engage this dispute but to note 
only that it is a disagreement about descriptive psychology. 
As a final example, take the dispute about naturalness.  There is a problem 
famously posed by Kripke (following Wittgenstein) about whether Karl—to adapt the 
issue to our own discussion—is adding or quadding, where to quad two numbers is to 
produce their sum up to some limit, and then to produce 5 thereafter (see Kripke 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
13 For the literature on disjunctivism, see the papers in Byrne and Logue 2009, and the paper by Paul 
Snowdon in this volume.   
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1982).  In his discussion of these matters, Lewis says that that in this case it one 
should adopt that view that Karl is adding, rather than quadding, because (to put it 
roughly) this is the most natural rule that Karl could be following (see Lewis 1983).  
As I understand it, it is conceded by Lewis that our evidence either from introspection 
or from behaviour could not discriminate these hypotheses; the fact that one 
hypothesis is natural is suggested as a further constraint that could.  Lewis’s 
suggestion is controversial, but for the moment I am not interested in assessing it.  
Instead, I am interested in noting that it seems to be a part of descriptive psychology.  
In particular, Lewis seems to be suggesting that in developing our theory of Karl we 
would need to be driven by the a priori constraint that Karl’s mental states attitudes 
are likely to be natural ones, other things being equal. 
In sum, it turns out that a lot of the questions that philosophers discuss when 
they discuss intentionality are questions in descriptive psychology.  This point is 
important because it shows that the point about the problem of intentionality we 
mentioned at the beginning of this section—that it concerns foundational rather than 
descriptive questions—is at best half right.  But it is also important for another reason, 
and this has to do with the question we raised earlier, viz., whether the epistemic 
response to the knowledge argument might be extended to the problem of 
intentionality.  If by ‘the problem of intentionality’ we mean what we might call the 
descriptive problem of intentionality—i.e. the (complex) problem of saying what 
mind Karl has—then it would seem that there is no easy extension of the epistemic 
response to the problem of intentionality.  This is not to say that we have nothing to 
learn about what mind Karl or anyone has—on the contrary, the questions here (as we 
have seen) are empirical, and with respect to those questions, the best policy is surely 
“tolerance and the experimental spirit,” as Quine famously said.  Nevertheless, it is 
not as if when we engage in the project of descriptive psychology we are concerned to 
assess arguments like the knowledge argument whose persuasiveness depends on all 
the facts being in; rather the issues have a different shape entirely. 
 
The Intentionality Problem and Foundational Psychology  
We have seen that if the problem of intentionality is interpreted as part of the project 
of descriptive psychology, then the epistemic response to the problem of 
consciousness is of only marginal relevance to it.  But suppose the problem is 
interpreted instead as part of the project foundational psychology. At the foundational 
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level, we face the question of in virtue of what (if anything) Karl has M17.  To focus 
on a specific mental state, suppose that, as part of having M17, Karl believes that 
Obama is president. With respect to this belief, the foundational question we need to 
focus on is this:  in virtue of what does Karl have this belief?  
 In my view, it is at this point that the considerations we marshalled in the 
course of developing the epistemic approach to the problem of consciousness have a 
role to play we turn to thinking about intentionality.  The reason is that it is possible 
to sketch an answer to the question just posed, and this answer is more plausible than 
it would otherwise be if considered in the light of the epistemic approach.   
The answer I have in mind is a version of the well-known Lewis-Armstrong 
argument for the identity theory (see Lewis 1966, Armstrong 1968). Transposed to 
our discussion, the first premise of this argument is that when Karl believes that 
Obama is president he is in a state that plays a particular theoretical role—i.e. it is a 
state that in Karl produces other states, and is produced in such and such 
circumstances, and produces such and such actions etc.  We might summarize this by 
saying that according to the first premise the belief that Obama is president in Karl is 
that state which satisfies role R.  The second premise of the argument is that there is 
some physical state of Karl that satisfies role R.  The conclusion drawn from these 
two premises is that the belief that Obama is president is that physical state.  If that 
argument is sound, it would be fair to say that we would have answered the 
foundational question about Karl, namely by saying in virtue of what he believes that 
Obama is president, namely in virtue of being in that physical state. 
 However, while this argument would (if sound) answer the foundational 
question, it raises a number of complicated and difficult issues.  The first concerns the 
first premise of the argument. Lewis’s defense14 of this premise involves the 
suggestion that the premise is not simply true, but true by definition; that is, Lewis 
thinks that the state of believing that Obama is president may be defined as the state 
whatever it is that plays the relevant role, something that follows simply from an 
understanding of the terms. Moreover, according to Lewis, the definition in question 
(a) constitutes a reductive definition in the sense that the role itself may be spelled out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
14 Armstrong seems to me more equivocal on the matter of issue of whether the first premise of the 
argument discussed in the text is true by definition, and so I will concentrate on Lewis here. 
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using no psychological vocabulary at all, and (b) is tacitly known by us, somewhat in 
the way that we know the syntactic rules of our native language (see Lewis 1994).  
But, in view of the controversy surrounding the possibility of reductive 
definitions in philosophy of any sort, this defense of the first premise makes the 
overall argument seem less plausible than it otherwise might be.  Moreover, it is an 
assumption that is not required by the soundness of the argument:  for a valid 
argument to be sound all that is required is that the premises are true, not that one of 
them is true by definition.  In the light of this, a very natural suggestion is that Lewis-
Armstrong argument is much more plausible if assumption that its first premise is 
analytic is dropped. 
 However, before we agree to this suggestion, we need to confront the reasons 
Lewis has for supposing that the first premise is analytic.  I think there are a number 
of considerations motivating Lewis at this point but perhaps the main one (and the 
one I will concentrate on) is that when he advances this argument, Lewis is concerned 
to defend, not simply the identity of mental states with physical states, but a certain 
sort of a priori materialism—i.e. the position we contrasted with a posteriori 
materialism earlier.  In particular, he is interested in the idea that, if the first premise 
of the argument is true by definition then the second premise of the argument will 
provide a physical statement that a priori entails the conclusion.  And this is exactly as 
a priori materialism requires. 
However, in the light of the epistemic approach to the problem of 
consciousness mentioned above, it should be clear that is not necessary to defend a 
priori materialism in this way.  For, in the light of that approach, it is possible to 
separate out two distinct claims:  the first claim is that the physical facts, whatever 
they are, a priori entail the psychological facts; the second claim is that it is possible 
to define the psychological facts in terms of the physical facts that we currently 
understand.  The epistemic approach is not opposed to the first claim (though it is not 
committed to it either); that is, it is not inconsistent with that approach that the 
physical facts a priori entail the psychological facts.  But it is opposed to the second 
claim, i.e. because according to it we are ignorant of some of the physical premises 
required in the entailment.   Hence if the picture associated with the epistemic 
response is coherent, then the first claim of the two just distinguished may be true 
even if the second is not. 
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How does this distinction make it more plausible to deny that the first premise 
of the Lewis-Armstrong argument is true by definition?  Well, as we just saw, 
Lewis’s reason for supposing that the first premise is true by definition is that if this is 
so, then a priori materialism will be true.  And Lewis is undoubtedly correct in 
asserting this conditional claim.  On the other hand, in the light the distinction just 
made, the reverse conditional is not true: a priori materialism might be true, even if 
the first premise of the argument is not true by definition—indeed, that is possibility 
made salient by the epistemic view.  But this allows us to agree with Lewis that a 
priori materialism is true but disagree with him that the first premise of the argument 
is true by definition.  And this in turn makes the argument much more plausible than 
it would otherwise be. 
The assumption that its first premise is true by definition is one controversial 
feature of the Lewis-Armstrong argument.  Another concerns its second premise, the 
suggestion that there is some physical state of Karl that plays the relevant role. The 
usual way to motivate this premise is to say that materialism is true, and hence that 
there must be some state which plays the role (if the role is played at all).  However, if 
the materialism at issue here is the sort we referred to earlier as ‘standard materialism’ 
this premise seems implausible.  For if standard materialism is true, then the premise 
says that there is some physical state of a type currently known of Karl that plays role 
R, and so, is his believing that Obama is president.  But this seems to greatly overstate 
the current level of understanding that we have into matters of this sort. In some 
cases, it is plausible to think that the relevant sciences here—i.e. cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience—have progressed to the point where they might identify some 
computational state of the brain with which particular mental states might be 
identified.  But in many cases this is not plausible: “The current situation in cognitive 
science is light years from being satisfactory. Perhaps somebody will fix it eventually; 
but not, I should think, in the foreseeable future, and not with the tools that we 
currently have at hand” (Fodor 2000, 5).  In short, if the second premise is understood 
in the light of standard materialism, one might well reject it on empirical grounds.  In 
turn, however, to reject it on empirical grounds is to give up the idea that there is any 
physical state in virtue of which Karl believes that Obama is president; at this point, 
the dualist alternative seems the only option.  
However, in the light of the epistemic approach to the problem of 
consciousness mentioned, it should be clear that is not necessary to defend the second 
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premise of the argument by appealing to standard materialism.  For suppose instead 
we operate with non-standard materialism, suppose the argument is set against the 
backdrop of non-standard materialism, i.e., against the view that tolerates the idea that 
we are missing certain types of facts which are relevant to the nature of mind.  Then 
we can think of the Armstrong-Lewis argument as setting out a strategy for solving 
the problem of intentionality, not as an argument that we currently have the materials 
to complete.   In summary, the perspective suggested by the passage from Jackson 
from which we began suggests that the premises of the Lewis-Armstrong argument 
can be defended in a different way from that suggested by Lewis.  In turn, doing that 
provides us with a better answer than we might otherwise have to questions 
distinctive of foundational psychology. 
 
The Problem of Self-Knowledge 
We noted at the outset that Ryle’s Cartesian holds two theses.  The first is the 
metaphysical thesis that mental phenomena and physical phenomena are distinct. The 
second is the epistemological thesis that that the mind is transparent to itself, i.e. that 
we have an introspective faculty which if used correctly can in principle illuminate all 
aspects of our mind. We have been concentrating on problems and arguments 
involved in the assessment of the first thesis, suggesting that the epistemic view is 
sufficient to answer arguments associated with consciousness, and helps out with the 
arguments associated with intentionality. 
 Turning to the second thesis, as in the case of metaphysical dualism, one 
might have thought that a small dose of scientifically informed common sense would 
be sufficient to reject it as well. Certainly it is a common feature of our intellectual 
culture that people are in many ways (as Wilson has put it recently) strangers to 
themselves (Cf. Wilson 2002).  Social psychologists (not to mention many modern 
novels) routinely tell us that we often quite wrong about our own basic motives, 
desires and character traits. Similarly cognitive psychologists and neural scientists 
portray the human mind as a congeries of different sub-systems operating 
independently of each other and on principles that are largely unknown to us (e.g. 
Fodor 1983). From this point of view, it is difficult to believe the picture of the mind 
as an arena in which in principle nothing is hidden.   
As in the case of metaphysical dualism, however, things are not so simple. For 
what has emerged particularly in recent discussions (e.g., Alston 1971, Shoemaker 
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1994, Moran 2001, Wright 2000, Byrne 2005) is that while we certainly do not have 
privileged access to all of our mental states, it is nevertheless the case that at least for 
some mental states our first person knowledge is quite different in character from 
(even if not always better than) the knowledge that one might have of the conscious 
states of others or indeed of other things quite generally. Moreover, this modernized 
form of privileged access has proved difficult to formulate precisely and leads to a 
number of puzzles and questions, just as Ryle thought, puzzles which have emerged 
in a somewhat piecemeal form in the literature over the last few decades of 
philosophical writing. 
How might one explain the sense in which self-knowledge is different from 
other knowledge?  It is obviously too late in the paper to give this question adequate 
attention.  But I think that the discussion we have been having about how think to 
about the problem of intentionality permits us to make a remark about how to think 
about the self-knowledge problem too.   For the problem of self-knowledge is 
fruitfully thought of as a problem of descriptive psychology, rather like the problems 
about non-existence, representationalism about perception, principles of charity, and 
naturalness that we considered earlier. We noted before that, in the case of descriptive 
semantics, it seemed reasonable as an a priori principle that if some descriptive 
semantic theory of the language that Karl speaks is correct, then Karl must know, at 
least for the most part, what according to the semantics he is saying.    A parallel 
suggestion, though suitably modified, might be true in the case, not of language but of 
mind:  if some descriptive psychological theory of Karl is correct, he must be able to 
know, at least for the most part and to the extent that he is rational, what mental states 
he is in according to the theory.  From this point of view Karl, for example, cannot 
view what mental states he is in (or what his words mean) as a subject matter that he 
may or may not take an interest in—in contrast, say to Russian literature, which 
surely is a topic he may or may not take an interest in.  Rather it is a subject matter 
about which if he is rational he can be assumed to have a certain sort of potential 
expertise. Spelling out what this expertise amounts too is a difficult matter, and will 
need to be left for another occasion. The point for us is that it is a project in 
descriptive psychology. 
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